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Governance and Environmental Policy Integration in Europe: What Can we learn from the EU Emission Trading Scheme? Summary
The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) is a landmark environmental policy, representing the world's first large-scale greenhouse gas (GHG) trading program. The coexistence of state actors and top-down processes with stakeholders participation and flexible abatement strategies make the EU ETS a powerful instrument of cross sectoral integration of environmental concerns, which benefits from a high level of interaction among the actors involved and a significant degree of information exchange. However, the same peculiarities of the system make it difficult to identify a correspondence with a single mode of governance. The EU ETS shows characteristics of the decision making processes and institutions engaged, the tools and instruments used as well as the actors involved, which change according to the different levels of governance, and belong both to the old and to the new modes of governance. The emission trading scheme represents a clear example of Multi-Level governance, where the different modes of governance interact among them and affect each other.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2005, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was officially launched, only two years after the European Council adopted the EU Emission Trading Directive (European Community 2003) . As a consequence of this formal start, the world's largest ever market in emissions has been established, and European companies across several sectors and industries now face a carbon-constrained reality in form of legally binding emission targets and a price that has to be paid for carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). Within essentially one year, 2004, the international carbon market has gained momentum through major policy developments and quick market responses, which among others have enabled the establishment of a framework for the EU carbon market.
The EU ETS is by far the largest cap-and-trade system in the world. It covers approximately 11,500 sources and the pre-policy emissions covered total to approximately 2.2 billion tons of CO 2 , corresponding to almost half of the CO 2 emissions originating from the EU. The market covers six key industrial sectors, notably electricity and heat production plants greater than 20MW capacity, oil refineries, coke ovens, metal ore and steel installations, cement kilns, glass manufacturing, ceramics manufacturing, and paper, pulp and board mills. The
Commission is willing to include other sectors and gases in the post-2012 period.
For instance, there is now growing agreement over the need to include aviation in the next trading period (European Commission, 2006b ). This paper analyses the instrument of emissions trading as a possibility to bridge the gap between environmental concerns and barriers against a broad and successful implementation of environmental policy in Europe.
In particular, we want to verify whether the EU Emission Trading Scheme has been able to integrate climate change concerns into the strategies of a wide array of stakeholders and industries. To provide a focussed analysis we firstly introduce the concept of environmental policy integration (EPI) in Section 2. We then discuss the EU ETS under the following three dimensions of governance and environmental policy integration: decision making processes and institutions engaged (Section 3), tools and instruments used (Section 4), and actors involved (Section 5). The dynamic processes that underpinned the development of EU ETS -in particular with reference to the negotiations among different actors and institutions -are presented in Section 6. After identifying the main instruments applied throughout the different phases of definition and implementation of the Emission Trading system, we relate the scheme to the more widely known modes of governance. In particular, Section 7 analyses the possible relevance of a system of multi-level governance considering the dominant modes of governance for each level and the interactions among them. Finally, in Section 8 we draw first lessons from the EU ETS as a tool to foster environmental policy integration on sectors' strategies and plans, and provide some conclusions for governance and environmental policy integration in general.
THE EPI CONCEPT
The EU ETS began operation on January 1, 2005. Even though the scheme faced a number of difficulties in its beginning -as will be discussed in more detail in this and the following sections -it turned out to be an effective tool to limit Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) emissions: the quantitative limit on CO 2 emissions became binding immediately on that date and a real or opportunity cost was imposed on the emissions of virtually all stationary industrial and electricity generating sources within the European Union. Within less than five years, the EU ETS evolved from being an innovative but controversial idea to an indispensable instrument of European climate change policy. The following quote from an observer at Point Carbon, one of the leading data providers and commentators on the EU ETS was typical of early opinion.
"We believe that the chances of having a Community-wide trading scheme in place by 2005 is a low-probability scenario." (Point Carbon, September 2001) This judgment by an insider indicates the difficulties related to the implementation of the EU ETS and makes the achievement even more impressive. The key steps in the process were the development of the Emission Trading (ET) Directive, the addition of the Linking Directive, and the unique EU process of transposition and implementation.
The main purpose of the European ET Directive 2003/87 was to establish a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading. The system could facilitate compliance to the Kyoto Protocol for the European Annex B parties, by establishing a market to address emission reduction requirements in a few specified sectors (energy activities, production and processing of metal ore, iron and steel, cement, glass and ceramic production, production of pulp, paper and board) referred to as "trading sectors". According to the Burden Sharing 5 Agreement of the Kyoto Protocol, each country was given a reduction target to comply with by 2012: the EU ETS established a first warm up phase from 2005 to 2007 and a "compliance phase" from 2008 to 2012 which coincides with the Kyoto Protocol compliance period. The warm up phase of the EU ETS was meant to put Member States on the path to compliance by starting to address the issue of emission reduction early enough to avoid dramatic cuts in the [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] period, and at the same time gain experience with the new compliance instrument. The EU ETS is a mandatory scheme, which means that all Member
States must be a party to it: for new countries, participation in the scheme is a precondition for becoming a party to the European Union itself.
Emission trading allows for the lowest cost reductions, letting countries/ installations with high abatement costs buy permits on the market from countries/installations whose abatement costs are much lower. Emission permits in the EU ETS are issued and exchanged in the market among countries, each permit allowing for the emission of 1 tonne of CO 2 equivalent. Allowances in the EU scheme are not printed but held in electronic accounts in registries in each Member State, who is responsible for the transcription of all transfers, cancellations, and surrenders of the permits. In order to link up to the registries system, each Member State must establish a national registry in the form of a standardised electronic database as well as a communication link. A Community Independent Transaction log keeps track of all movements of permits and serves as verification for irregularities.
The first step in creating a market for carbon permits is to establish a volume level: through National Allocation Plans (NAPs), subject to the European Commission's approval, each Member State has to propose a total number of allowances and the way it plans to allocate them to national installations belonging to the trading sectors for each trading phase, of which 95% during the warm up phase and 90% during every subsequent period must be allocated for free. The allocation plan must respect a list of criteria provided by the European 
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The characteristics and the results discussed above clearly show the potential of the system to integrate environmental concerns, regarding in this case compliance to the Kyoto Protocol and CO 2 emissions reduction, into sectoral policies. The choice of a market instrument, instead of a command and control policy, was taken with the purpose to internalize the negative externality through the most economically efficient solution. Even though compliance with the EU ETS is mandatory for the identified sectors, the costs of compliance for individual sources are minimised as compared to other instruments of control. The key advantage of emissions trading is that firms can flexibly choose to meet their targets, rather than use predetermined technologies or standards. Emissions sources with low-cost reduction opportunities can over comply and sell their additional allowances to sources where reductions would be more difficult and costly. This leads to the lowest overall cost. Emission trading is particularly relevant to climate change mitigation as carbon dioxide and other GHGs have the same effect wherever they are emitted, but compliance costs differ dramatically across sources. Hence there is considerable scope for trading, and opportunity for considerable gains from these trades.
Many strategic and implementation issues have been solved through an intense debate and a profitable interaction between the Commission, the Member States and the stakeholders, improving the degree of information availability and the capacity of using the results of early actions and consultative processes for policy making process. On September 15th, the EU foreign ministers formally adopted the Linking Directive, connecting the EU ETS to the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms in that it gives firms direct access to credits from project mechanisms as a means of meeting their emission caps. The final text allows firms to have direct access to CDM credits from 2005 and to JI credits from 2008, independently from the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, credits from nuclear projects and from sinks are excluded in the first phase, while hydroelectricity projects must be implemented following international rules. Finally, no formal limitation to the quantity of credits to be included in the European emissions trading scheme is imposed, but Member States must consider the issue of supplementarity by the end of 2007 and specify a limit up to which individual installations will be able to use these credits to comply with the emissions trading scheme. European Commission has thus met its objective to enable its entry into force before the 1 January, start date for trading in the EU trading scheme.
DECISION MAKING PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS
The Emission Trading Directive
Transposition and implementation
Member States needed to transpose the Emission Trading Directive in national law by 31 December 2003. However, the tight deadlines and short time period to get used to the new instrument and to prepare the first national allocation plans made it difficult for Member States to meet this deadline. As a consequence, the 
TOOLS AND INSTRUMENTS
The EU ETS is based on the belief that market-based instruments can play a major role in environmental policy. While command and control instruments operate by imposing mandatory obligations on the behaviour of firms and individuals, transferable permits create markets for the pollution externality.
Marketable permits are based on the principle of economic incentives and freedom of choice in the context of the workings of the market. By defining property rights for environmental resources and making them tradable, a marketclearing price emerges as a market for these permits develops, indicating the opportunity cost of emissions. The "cap-and-trade" marketable emission trading scheme starts from the setting of the "cap", or the total quantity of emissions allowed. The system is constantly monitored and sufficient penalties are applied to sources which emit in excess. It is the exchange process that generates the attractive qualities of the system. In effect, polluters with low costs of abatement will find it relatively easy to abate pollution rather than buy more permits while polluters with higher costs of abatement will acquire permits rather than abating emissions. Thus both parties benefit from the trade and cost minimization behavior will result into the equalization of marginal abatement costs, enabling thus actors to achieve environmental goals at lowest possible costs compared to other policy instruments. While the EU ETS is clearly motivated by the Kyoto Protocol, and probably would not have been adopted otherwise, it is also curiously independent of the Kyoto Protocol. This is mainly shown by the fact that the ETS is embedded in EU law 13 and its implementation does not depend on the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
Finally, as illustrated by the current "post-2012" discussion, the EU ETS is expected to continue beyond 2012 regardless of the fate of the Kyoto Protocol.
The instrument of emissions trading has gained momentum in Europe based on the US precedents. Indeed, there were also some early European experiences with CO 2 emissions trading. The three most important ones were the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS), the Danish CO 2 trading program, and the Dutch procurement tenders for JI and CDM credits, ERUPT and CERUPT respectively. All of these are different in important ways from the EU ETS, but they contributed to making emissions trading a less foreign innovation. While the instrument of emission trading has cautiously become more popular over the last years, at the same time the traditionally used instruments have faced increasingly difficulties on an EU-wide scale. For instance, efforts to get a carbon tax adopted had failed because, as a fiscal matter, it required unanimity in the Council of Ministers. Such an agreement was impossible to obtain; Member
States from North to South within the EU had several difficulties with the tax, mainly rising from intense industrial lobbying.
The EU ETS seems to apply different tools for distinct levels of governance. At the EU level, the instruments used for policy formulation and for the implementation phase mainly refer to the so-called "old" mode of governance, and are based on detailed legislation, use of sanctions and setting of legally binding objectives. However at the Member States level the system offers more flexibility, mainly arising from the creation of a market that opens the possibility of voluntary agreement and exchanges among firms and countries. 6 The UK ETS, which started in 2001, is a mixed absolute cap and baseline-and-credit system intended to provide experience for firms willing to accept a cap in return for an incentive payment and introduce flexibility into Climate Change Agreements that had been negotiated between industry and the government. The Danish CO 2 trading system, which started in 2002, was limited to the electric utility sector and it included a safety valve feature at a relatively low level (approximately US$7/tonne CO 2 ). The Dutch ERUPT/CERUPT programs were solicitations for JI and CDM credits that could be used as Kyoto compliant offsets with a relatively low ceiling price.
ACTORS AND NEGOTIATION PROCESSES
The actors involved in the EU Emission Trading scheme show distinctive roles at different levels of governance.
At the international level, the system benefited from the extraordinary strong role of the EU Commission, which assured the unexpected rapidity and the effectiveness of the whole process. The EU ETS is basically a mandatory system, with binding rules, central monitoring and administrative experts.
However, despite the hierarchical character of the system, national control over cap setting gave it fundamental decentralised character compared, for example, to the US SO 2 and NO X trading system. Within the Member States, companies of the six covered industry sectors were closely involved in the set-up of the EU ETS, particularly in the context of the allocation process. In fact, as emphasised in Buchner et al. (2007) , the allocation process can best be described as an extended dialogue between the government and industry in each country. The reason for this involvement of industry in the process is two-fold: first, as a consequence of the scarce data situation at installation level, the companies were needed in order to provide more detailed information on their emissions data. Second, the Emissions Trading Directive mandated that at least 95% of the allowances in Member States be allocated for free to the covered installations, creating thus a significant value of these endowments. These two factors together created an intense iterative process between the relevant parts of the Member State governments and the affected industry whereby data was collected, cross-checked, and refined at the same time that distribution proposals were made, evaluated against the data, and modified until a final NAP emerged. This interactive process was a key factor in successfully completing the NAP process.
At the same time, each country had for obvious reasons to face difficult negotiation processes with companies and industry associations, which often claimed that the NAPs could place them in competitive disadvantage. The government had thus a role of a final arbiter, managing a process by which conflicting claims could be resolved. The industry clearly engaged in much lobbying, but the fixed total forced all players into a zero-sum game where a
defensive concern about what competitors would receive became as important as offensive attempts to gain more for themselves (Cf. Buchner et al. 2007 ).
However it should be noticed that, while EU industries were almost unanimously critical of the EU carbon or energy tax initiatives, several of them welcomed the idea of emission trading as a central, cost-effective, instrument of climate policy.
British Petroleum (BP) started an internal pilot system in September 1998 and The NAP process throughout the EU-25 Member States has been extremely complex and contentious, and intense debates caused delays in the submissions and consequently decisions on the NAPs. Still, given the highly different circumstances of the EU Member States and their equally varying commitments to adopting meaningful measures to restrict CO 2 emissions, the fact that the EU ETS was launched on time and that agreements on the overall allocation could be found is a major achievement. The first phase from 2005 to 2007 is explicitly referred to as a pilot phase, and many decisions have been taken to ensure a timely start of the scheme and to make experiences for the subsequent periods.
In particular, the limited data availability posed a challenge for the allowance allocation. A much-noted by-product of the need to acquire installation-level data for allowance allocation was the resulting significant improvement in the quality of the data on emissions and energy use. Still, until aggregate emission data was released after the first year of the scheme, no one had a really good idea of what aggregate emissions of the covered sectors are, and for this reason -as well as for reasons of creating acceptance across the Member States -the market was characterised by a higher than anticipated supply in the first years, affecting the stringency and consequently carbon price of the scheme.
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Notwithstanding all the difficulties, the EU Commission maintained its strong central role throughout the whole process, imposing its rules for allocation and penalizing with warning and legal actions non-complying countries, in order to avoid a watering-down of the EU ETS principles. Signals for the second phase allocations indicate that the Commission aims at a more stringent allocation for the second phase, ensuring thus a viable market. In conclusion, the role of the centre was critical in arriving at the final outcome. 10 Indeed, it is hard to imagine how twenty-five nations could have succeeded in such a multi-national enterprise without the central coordinating role played by the European Commission.
DYNAMIC EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE IN THE EU ETS
The governance perspective characterising the EU ETS can be analysed as a dynamic process which moves from an initial shaping of the system with the characteristic features of the Open Methods of Coordination (OMC) (see, for instance, Eberlein, Newman 2006) , to a binding and structured approach, which leaves nonetheless flexibility at the state level.
9 While over-allocation cannot be dismissed as a possibility, a long position is not per se evidence of over-allocation, as installations could also have abated in order to sell allowances or to bank them for use in later years. For a preliminary analysis of this issue based on the 2005 data see Ellerman and Buchner (2006) . 10 The Commission acted as agent for the whole in implementing a commonly agreed upon policy, and was as educator and facilitator of the decisions that Member States had to take. In addition, it provided technical competence and political capability generally displayed in supporting the scheme. Of course, there were also problems in the Commission's implementation of the Directive. Specifically, there was widespread criticism of the lack of sufficient guidance on what constituted an installation. The Commission's assessment process has also been criticised as being too 'high level', not transparent enough and not involving enough technical expertise in the sense that decisions on the evaluation of the allocation plans have not always made by those who were familiar with the technical details of the different countries. For a discussion of the various aspects of the Commission's role see Buchner et al. (2007) .
The rationale behind the creation of an emission trading scheme, and the experiences carried out at the international level, in particular the US experience of sulphur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxide (NO X ) emission trading, showed a dynamic nature, decentralised in its functioning and based on experience sharing and comparison of best practice, rather than on a single legislative framework.
Throughout most of the 1990s, the EU had been the leading sceptic in global climate diplomacy to emissions trading, favouring instead coordinated policies and measures. The EU ETS developed in contrast to command-and-control approaches, and even to the taxation instrument, and its potential for reconciling EU economic and environmental goals encouraged its definition. The system was therefore designed as a flexible mechanism that should help Member States to progress jointly towards the Kyoto target, through horizontal learning processes.
A first "warm-up" phase of the EU ETS (2005 to 2007) was intended to be a pilot phase allowing for 'learning by doing'. It was commonly accepted that a certain amount of adaptation would be necessary.
Success of the EU ETS depends, inter alia, on simplicity. While all stakeholders agree in principle to strive towards a simple and consistent scheme, there was pressure on governments to grant exemptions and special treatment in national allocations, which tends to increase complexity. An overly complex EU ETS will jeopardise attainment of both environmental and economic objectives, which, namely, are to reach the necessary reductions at the least cost.
However, as an international-wide trading scheme across a range of industries, the EU ETS required the construction of a novel regulatory system. This complex process generated intense debate over near-and long-term economic and political consequences.
The discussion began at the institutional level, right after the issue of the 2000 ET Green paper, which started to enrich the discourse around the EU ETS. The Green Paper outlined several options with regard to the binding nature of the system, including a more flexible "opt-in" clause for the genuinely interested Member States and "opt-out" clauses for certain sectors. It should be noted that, although a mandatory character was envisaged for the system, national control over cap setting gave it a fundamental flexible and decentralised character. that of separate national caps after 2012 determined by each Member State, and will consider specific issues related to auctioning and benchmarking.
At the same time, the Commission underlines the importance of robust compliance and enforcement procedures for the good functioning of the scheme.
It will be considered whether the monitoring and reporting guidelines should be laid down in a Regulation in order to aid harmonised application of the legislation.
Some of the options identified in the review would result in a considerable number of additional tasks to be undertaken at the community level to implement the EU ETS after 2012. The institutional arrangements at both Community and Member State level are therefore being adapted to new needs arising out of the review. The result is a more mature scheme, supported by a structured and binding system of rules, targets, monitoring and sanctions, but which maintains its flexible character at the Member States level.
MODES OF GOVERNANCE
The peculiar characteristics of the EU ETS make it difficult to relate it to a specific mode of governance. The system shows many aspects belonging to the "old" The different modes of governance interact among them and affect each other.
Considering the evolution of the system and the proposals made by the Commission for a review of the ETS, we could identify a kind of "behavioural interaction".
CONCLUSIONS
The timeline of the two directives relevant for the EU ETS highlights the enormous achievement of European climate policy in implementing an efficient method of cross-sectoral integration. Even though the time span between the proposal for the emissions trading scheme and its actual implementation was short, the process that led to the current situation has posed several significant challenges and overcome several barriers. From the initial milestone, the Green
Paper that extensively discussed and proposed emissions trading as an idea for Europe, to the actual fundamental role in the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), the Emission Trading Directive has faced resistance and caused tough debates, involving at the same time state and non-state actors.
Given the tight deadlines faced during this difficult negotiation process, the achievement that the EU Emission Trading Scheme now has become the cornerstone of European climate policy is even more outstanding. Within less than five years, the EU ETS has evolved from an innovative idea to an indispensable instrument for Europe's approach to cope with climate change.
Overall, the staged nature of implementation -in the sense that only few Member
States were formally ready when the EU ETS started in January 2005 -highlighted that Member State governments were working under tight deadlines and high pressure to set up institutions and pass laws and regulations in preparation for a timely start of the scheme. Given all these additional difficulties and barriers, and particularly the regulatory delays in Member State governments surrounding some NAPs as well as the establishment of national registries, the timely start of the EU-wide emissions trading scheme is even more astonishing. The EU ETS can thus be assessed positively with respect to the process of EPI that it has initiated, encouraging a wide variety of actors -both private and public, at the EU level, national, and regional -to consider climate change in their planning and actions. In spite of the success and spread of the system, however, it is too early to assess its effectiveness in terms of significantly reducing GHGs 24 emissions. The debate on the real effectiveness of the first "pilot" phase of the EU ETS in terms of emissions reduction, thus, remains open and crucial.
